Israel Medical Association Journal

Background: Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) has emerged as a challenging nosocomial pathogen in the last 50 years.

Objectives: To describe an investigation and containment of an MRSA outbreak in a neonatal intensive care unit (NICU).

Methods: Our NICU is a 25-bed level III unit. Almost 540 neonates are admitted yearly. The index case was an 8 day old term baby. MRSA was isolated from his conjunctiva. Immediate infection control measures were instituted, including separation of MRSA+ carriers, strict isolation, separate nursing teams, and screening of all infants for MRSA. Healthcare workers and parents of positive cases were screened and re-educated in infection control measures. New admissions were accepted to a clean room and visiting was restricted. MRSA isolates were collected for molecular testing.

Results: MRSA was isolated from five infants by nasal and rectal swabs, including the index case. Screening of healthcare workers and families was negative. Two MRSA+ patients already known in the pediatric intensive care unit (PICU) located near the NICU were suspected of being the source. All NICU isolates were identical by pulsed-field gel electrophoresis but were different from the two PICU isolates. The NICU and one of the PICU isolates were defined as ST-5 strain by multilocus sequence typing. One PICU isolate was ST-627. All NICU isolates were Panton–Valentine leukocidin negative and SCCmec type IV. No further cases were detected, and no active infections occurred.

Conclusions: A strict infection control policy and active screening are essential in aborting outbreaks of MRSA in the NICU.

The world now faces the dreadful possibility of biological weapons attacks by terrorists. Healthcare systems would have to cope with such emergencies should all preemptive measures fail. Information gained from the Global Mercury exercise and the SARS outbreak has shown that containing an outbreak at the start is more effective than reacting to it once it has spread and that containment should be treated both nationally and internationally. On the national level this entails developing rapid and effective methods to detect and identify infected cases, and implementing isolation and control measures to lower the risk of further transmission of the disease while assuring the safety of medical teams and laboratory workers. Strategic contingency plans should incorporate well-defined procedures for hospitalization and isolation of patients, providing regional backup of medical personnel and equipment and maintaining close cooperation between the various bodies in the healthcare system. Quarantine is an effective containment measure, especially if voluntarily imposed. Modern communication systems can help by sending professional teams timely instructions and providing the public with information to reduce panic and stress during quarantine procedures. Informing the public poses a dilemma: finding a balance between giving advance warning of an imminent epidemic outbreak and ascertaining the likelihood of its occurrence. Containment of international bioterrorist attacks depends entirely on close international cooperation to implement national and international strategic contingency plans with free exchange of information and recognition of procedures.